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I. INTRODUCTION
Subcontracting is "the process by which a company purchases
goods or services from another enterprise which it might otherwise
have produced or performed at its own plants and facilities."' The
parties to labor agreements frequently and intensely dispute issues
involving subcontracting.2 The power to subcontract has been termed
an entrepreneurial right that is necessary for management to operate
businesses properly. 3 For a variety of reasons, an employer may
decide to subcontract unit work4 while a collective bargaining agree-
ment is in effect. The union may consider subcontracting violative of
a collective bargaining agreement's clause specifically restricting, but
1. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations
Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 413 (1950). Another definition that is frequently used in labor
relations describes subcontracting as: "making an agreement to have another person (human
or corporate) do construction, perform service, or manufacture or assemble products that
could be performed by payroll, unit employees." Fruehauf Corp., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 37, 40
(1974) (McBrearty, Arb.).
2. "Subcontracting issues generate as much insecurity within a work force as perhaps any
other single issue. Frequently, the feeling is intense and comes out in the form: if they get
away with this, everybody's job will be next and the Union will be left holding a meaningless
contract." Chase Barlow Lumber Co., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 336, 339 (1981) (Beckman, Arb.).
3. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of Fibreboard, see infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
4. In this Comment, the term "unit work" refers to work that a particular bargaining
unit performs under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
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not prohibiting, the right to subcontract.5 In the absence of a clause
that addresses subcontracting, a union may still claim that subcon-
tracting is a method for management to circumvent the heart of a
collective bargaining agreement-the wage, seniority, and recognition
clauses.6 Unless a union and an employer agree that the decision to
subcontract does not violate the collective bargaining agreement, an
arbitrator will have to settle the issue.7
Many collective bargaining agreements contain clauses restrict-
ing subcontracting,' but only two percent contain clauses that strictly
prohibit the practice. 9 Many of these limiting clauses, moreover,
exempt the employer from the subcontracting restriction for various
reasons, including instances when the necessary equipment is unavail-
able"° or where a past practice of subcontracting exists."
Subcontracting of work is closely related to the issues of work
transfer and partial business closure. The reasons employers use for
subcontracting work, transferring work, or partially closing their
businesses are often the same-reducing costs. 12 For example, man-
5. See John Deere Horicon Works of Deere & Co., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8407
(1987) (Staudter, Arb.), discussed infra in notes 159-64 and accompanying text; Tri-County
Distrib., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8082 (1985) (Perry, Arb.), discussed infra in notes
165-68 and accompanying text; Iowa Mfg. Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 599 (1977) (Sembower,
Arb.).
6. See Advertiser Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8224 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.),
discussed infra in notes 173-77 and accompanying text; Mead Corp., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 665
(1980) (Gross, Arb.).
7. Ninety-eight percent of collective bargaining agreements in a survey sample contained
clauses requiring arbitration of unsettled disputes. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont.
(BNA) 51:5 (1989).
8. According to a 1986 survey, 54% of the sampled collective bargaining agreements
contained subcontracting clauses. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1989).
That is up from 50% in a 1983 study and 44% in a 1979 study. 2 Collective Bargaining
Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1986). The pattern varies in different industries. Agreements in
the construction, apparel, and the mining and rubber industries have the highest levels of
clauses with 90%, 89%, and 83% respectively. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont.
(BNA) 65:2 (1989). Furthermore, unlike agreements restricting the other management rights
surveyed (supervisory performance of work, technological changes, and plant relocation), the
percentage of collective bargaining agreements containing subcontracting clauses is higher in
non-manufacturing industries than in manufacturing industries. Id.
9. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1989).
10. Id.
11. Id. It may be difficult to determine just what constitutes a past practice of
subcontracting. For example, subcontracting does not include acceptance of government
services without cost to the employer, regardless of whether the service is supplementing the
unit work or totally replacing it. In United States Steel Corp., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8470 (1986) (Dybeck, Arb.), a private company discontinued its in-plant firefighting and
ambulance services, replacing the employees who performed these functions with municipal
services. Id. at 4969. The arbitrator did not consider the action as falling within the definition
of subcontracting, and he denied the grievance. Id. at 4972.
12. Because an employer's decision to subcontract work, transfer work, or partially close
[Vol. 44:371
19891 ARBITRAL TREATMENT OF SUBCONTRACTING
agement can reduce costs either by subcontracting work to someone
who can perform the work at lower cost or by moving the work to
another of the company's facilities. Management can similarly reduce
costs by closing an unprofitable part of its business. The effects of
management's decisions to subcontract, transfer work, or partially
close its business are also similar. Employee layoffs, reductions in
hours worked, and decreases in a bargaining unit's size may injure
employees and unions.' 3 The threat also exists that management will
intentionally use subcontracting, work transfers, and partial closures
to injure the union.' 4 By liberally subcontracting, transferring work,
or closing part of a business, management can also subvert the wage,
hour, and recognition clauses in collective bargaining agreements.
For instance, management may agree to pay its employees a set wage
for particular work, and then it might eliminate that work.' 5 In spite
of the many similarities among these actions, the courts and the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") have not
always been clear about whether their decisions in response to any
one of these three management actions apply to the other two.
16
Arbitrators, as creatures of contract, enforce the intent of the
parties and are not required to follow the precedents of either the
Board or the courts.1 7 Commentators have frequently discussed an
its business may often be based on the same reasons and may also have the same effects, the
three areas are often considered together. See Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 893-94
(1984) (plurality opinion) (Otis Elevator fl), rev'g 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981) (Otis Elevator 1).
13. See, e.g., Pickands Mather & Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1183, 1188-89 (1982) (Garrett,
Arb.); Transit Auth., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 616, 620 (1980) (Chapman, Arb.); Olympia
Brewing Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 20, 29 (1978) (Madden, Arb.); City of Hamtramck, 71 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 822, 826 (1978) (Roumell, Arb.); Central Ohio Transit Auth., 71 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 9, 16-17 (1978) (Handsaker, Arb.).
14. See Kansas City Power & Light Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1124, 1127 (1982) (Madden,
Arb.); Delta Ref. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 710, 713-14 (1982) (Boals, Arb.); Blue Diamond
Coal Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 702, 704-05 (1982) (Davies, Arb.); Mead Corp., 75 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 665, 666-67 (1980) (Gross, Arb.); Transit Auth., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 616, 620 (1980)
(Chapman, Arb.).
15. See American Sugar Ref. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 409, 414 (1960) (Crawford, Arb.)
(discussing the ability of employers to destroy the integrity of a collective bargaining
agreement by subcontracting); see also infra note 119.
16. In two recent Board decisions, Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (plurality
opinion), rev'g 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981), and Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring
Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), rev'g 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982)
(Milwaukee Spring I), aff'd sub nor. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the
Board compared work transfer and relocation to subcontracting. For a discussion of these
cases, see infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
17. [T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a
question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was
bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the
contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation
of the contract is different from his.
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employer's ability to subcontract, transfer work, and partially close its
business.'" The impact on the ability to subcontract resulting from
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB '9 and from the Board's decisions in Mil-
waukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring
11)2° and Otis Elevator Co. (Otis Elevator i/),21 is the further subject of
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). The Supreme
Court restated its position in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983):
When the parties include an arbitration clause in their collective-bargaining
agreement, they choose to have disputes concerning constructions of the contract
resolved by an arbitrator. Unless the arbitral decision does not "dra[w] its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement," [Enterprise, 363 U.S.] at 597,
a court is bound to enforce the award and is not entitled to review the merits of
the contract dispute. This remains so even when the basis for the arbitrator's
decision may be ambiguous.
Grace, 461 U.S. at 764.
An arbitrator, however, does not have complete discretion in interpreting collective bar-
gaining agreements:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bar-
gaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.
He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legiti-
mate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.
Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597.
18. See, e.g., Comment, Job Security, Managerial Prerogatives, and First National
Maintenance, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 509 (1982) (discussing employers' ability to partially close
businesses); Comment, Labor Law-The Employer's Duty to Bargain Over a Decision to Close
Part of Its Business, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 185 (1981) (discussing First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)).
19. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). In First National Maintenance, the United States Supreme Court
held that an employer could partially close her business for purely economic reasons, even if
the closure caused the discharge of employee members of a bargaining unit. Id. at 686. For a
further discussion of First National Maintenance, see infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
20. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II), rev'g 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982)
(Milwaukee Spring I), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). While
Milwaukee Spring I was on appeal, the membership of the Board was changed by President
Reagan. His appointments shifted the majority of the Board to one more "philosophically in
tune with the [Reagan] administration." Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1982, at A16, col. 2. The Board
then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to remand
Milwaukee Spring I for further consideration. Milwaukee Spring Div. of I11. Coil Spring Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2376 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit granted the
petition. Id. The Board reheard the case in Milwaukee Spring I. In Milwaukee Spring H,
the Board held that the transfer of a portion of an employer's work from one of its unionized
facilities to one of its non-unionized facilities, solely to save on labor costs, was not a violation
of the Act. 268 N.L.R.B. at 602. For a further discussion of the Milwaukee Spring cases, see
infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
21. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (plurality opinion), rev'g 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981) (Otis
Elevator I). Otis Elevator H has a procedural history similar to Milwaukee Spring I. In Otis
Elevator I, the Board found that the employer had committed unfair labor practices. Upon
reconsideration, the Board held that an employer's decision to relocate work without
bargaining was not a violation of the Act if the move was made due to a change in the "nature
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comment.
Surrounding these decisions is the tendency of the Board and the
courts to defer increasingly to arbitration in labor disputes.22 How
will Milwaukee Spring II, Otis Elevator II, and First National Mainte-
nance affect arbitral decisions? This Comment explores arbitral rea-
soning used in interpreting collective bargaining agreements that
contain vague language concerning subcontracting. It also addresses
the Board's and the court's doctrinal developments protecting
entrepreneurial discretion and the influences of these developments on
arbitrator's decisions. It is the premise of this Comment that arbitra-
tors have not changed their analysis of subcontracting disputes and
embraced the reasoning of the Milwaukee Spring II decision.
Section II of this Comment discusses subcontracting as an enti-
tlement 23 sought by the parties to collective bargaining agreements,
and it explores possible methods for deciding to which party the enti-
tlement belongs. Beginning with the 1964 decision in Fibreboard
Paper Products v. NLRB 24 and continuing through the 1984 decisions
in Milwaukee Spring II and Otis Elevator II, Section III of this Com-
ment reviews the decisional law of the Board and the courts concern-
ing subcontracting, transfer of work, and partial closure. Section IV
of this Comment explores arbitrators' reasoning in subcontracting
decisions and compares cases decided before and after Milwaukee
Spring II2 and First National Maintenance.26 Finally, this Comment
ends by discussing the differences between arbitral and Board treat-
ment of subcontracting and by considering the possible effects of Mil-
waukee Spring II on arbitrators. This Comment concludes that there
has been no change in the arbitral treatment of subcontracting since
Milwaukee Spring I.
or direction of the business." 269 N.L.R.B. at 894. For a further discussion of Otis Elevator,
see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
22. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574-76 (1984); United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
23. For a more detailed description of the entitlement theory, see Lynch, Deferral, Waiver,
and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 237 (1989).
24. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). For a further discussion of Fibreboard, see infra notes 58-66 and
accompanying text.
25. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), rev'g 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee Spring I), aff'd
sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
26. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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II. SUBCONTRACTING AS AN ENTITLEMENT IN LABOR LAW
Two primary issues arise when considering subcontracting as an
entitlement in labor law. The first is whether subcontracting is an
entitlement that is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2 7 The second is whether the
right to subcontract or to prevent subcontracting belongs to the
employer or to the union; included within this second issue is the
question of how to determine the ownership of these rights.
A. The Duty to Bargain over Subcontracting
The NLRA requires that management and unions bargain over
rates of pay, wages, hours, and conditions of employment.28 In
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, z9 the United States
Supreme Court held that subcontracting is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.30 Although it is an unfair labor practice to
refuse to bargain over a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,3
there is no requirement that the parties agree on mandatory sub-
jects.32 Nonetheless, because subcontracting is a mandatory subject of
bargaining, if either party wishes to bargain over subcontracting, the
other party is required to bargain as well. After bargaining to
impasse33 with management, however, a union may strike to achieve a
27. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
28. NLRA §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), 8(d), 9(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3), 158(a)(5), 158(d), 159(a)). Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA makes it an
unfair labor practice to violate employee's rights to form organizations and to bargain
collectively. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor
practice to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment [so as] to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice to
refuse to bargain collectively over the provisions of Section 9(a). NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5). Section 8(d) requires the employer and the employees' representative to bargain
collectively over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" and provides,
with some exceptions, that "where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract ... the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or
modify such contract." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Section 9(a) makes the designated
labor organization, with some exceptions, the sole representative of the employees in
bargaining "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment." NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
29. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
30. Id. at 215 (discussing replacement of employees in a bargaining unit with those of an
independent contractor).
31. NLRA §§ 8(d), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a).
32. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1952).
33. The concept of impasse has been developed as "a necessary [judicial] response to a
state of facts in which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked." NLRB v.
Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963). See generally Stewart & Engeman, Impasse,
[Vol. 44:371
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desired contract.34
In contrast, a permissive subject of bargaining may be brought
up during negotiations, but agreement to terms regarding the permis-
sive subject may not be insisted upon by either party. 35 Determining
whether a labor issue is a mandatory or a permissive subject of bar-
gaining is important; although the parties must bargain over
mandatory subjects of bargaining, it is an unfair labor practice to
insist that permissible subjects of bargaining be included in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 36 If subcontracting were a permissive sub-
ject of bargaining, unions and employers would be permitted, but not
required, to bargain over the subject in negotiations. 37  However, if
subcontracting were a permissive subject of bargaining, it would be an
unfair labor practice for unions to strike solely over the issue of sub-
contracting or for employers to insist on a collective bargaining agree-
ment containing a subcontracting clause.38
During the bargaining stage of a labor agreement, the distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects can become blurred. The
parties may disagree over both mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining, and in either case, the agreement will remain unsigned
until each party is sufficiently satisfied with the language.39 If, how-
Collective Bargaining and Action, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 233 (1970) (discussing the difficulties of
applying the term "impasse").
34. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). "[B]ut such obligation [to bargain collectively]
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Id.
35. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958).
36. Id. at 349. After the employees selected the UAW-CIO as their representative, the
employer insisted that the collective bargaining agreement include two clauses. Id. at 344-47.
The first clause recognized only the local UAW-CIO union, but not the international union, as
the employees' representative. Id. at 345. The second clause was a ballot clause that required
a minimum thirty day negotiating period, followed by a secret ballot among the employees,
before the employees could strike over a nonarbitral issue. Id. at 345-46 & n.3. If the
employees voted to strike, the employer would have seventy-two hours to give a counter-
proposal. Id. at 346 & n.3. The company made it clear that it would not enter into an
agreement unless it included the two clauses. Id. at 347. The Supreme Court thus confronted
the issue of whether the clauses were mandatory subjects of bargaining within the definition
provided by Section 8(d) of the NLRA. The Court concluded that they were not. Id. at 349-
50. Furthermore, the Court held that, although the employer could propose the clauses,
insistence upon permissible subjects of bargaining as conditions to an agreement that includes
mandatory subjects is a refusal to bargain collectively. Id.
37. See id. at 349.
38. See id.
39. A clever negotiator can withhold agreement on the terms of mandatory subjects of
bargaining until there is sufficient agreement on permissive subjects. Using this tactic, the
withholding party cannot be accused of refusing to agree due to remaining disagreements over
a permissive subject of bargaining. For a criticism of Borg- Warner, which held that a party
cannot withhold agreement due to a permissive subject of bargaining, see Cox, Labor Decisions
of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1082-83 (1958); Duvin,
The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 271-33 (1964).
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ever, the parties do not include a mandatory subject such as subcon-
tracting in the agreement, and they later wish to bargain over it
during the term of the agreement, the distinction between mandatory
and permissive subjects will emerge more forcefully.
If labor and management fail to include a mandatory subject of
bargaining in a collective bargaining agreement, they must bargain
over that subject if it arises during the course of the agreement.' The
Supreme Court's holding in Fibreboard thus suggests that a union or
an employer can insist on contractual language concerning a subcon-
tracting clause because subcontracting is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.4 A union may strike and an employer may refuse to sign a
collective bargaining agreement if the agreement does not contain a
desired clause addressing subcontracting.42 Fibreboard, however,
neither gives management the right to subcontract nor does it give a
union the right to prevent subcontracting.
B. Property Entitlements and Subcontracting
Once subcontracting has been determined to be a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining, two further issues concerning subcontracting as a
property entitlement remain to be determined. The first issue is which
party possesses the entitlement in the absence of a clause specifically
addressing subcontracting.4 3 The second issue is whether the entitle-
40. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1221 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1952). Midterm modifications of agreements have become less significant, however, with the
extensive use of zipper clauses. When parties agree to a zipper clause, they agree to waive their
rights to bargain during the term of an agreement over subject matter that is not specifically
included in their collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 1220 & n.13. Judge Harry T.
Edwards has described the zipper clause as an agreement waiving the right to force bargaining
over issues not contemplated in the agreement. See Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and
Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 23, 34 (1985). Thus, the zipper clause is an implicit agreement to maintain the
status quo on certain issues. By incorporating the issues of mandatory and permissive subjects
of bargaining into an agreement, the parties thus contract out of NLRA Section 8(a)(5) and, in
a sense, out of NLRA Section 8(d). See id.
Additionally, arbitration may be required on issues not contemplated in the agreement.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) allows suits over labor disputes
to be brought in the federal courts. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120,
tit. III, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185). Federal courts, however, can
compel arbitration over an issue that a contract does not specifically address by finding that the
issue which is not specifically addressed falls under the management rights clause. Id. Judge
Edwards envisioned enforcement of the parties' "private ordering" agreement, rather than
imposition of public law, to resolve conflicts and fill gaps in labor contracts. Edwards, supra,
at 34-35.
41. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
42. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
43. The party initially possessing the entitlement can retain the entitlement or trade it for
an entitlement which the other party initially possessed. This Comment, however, is
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ment is alienable and can be sold or traded between the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement.
Initial possession of an entitlement that is not specifically
addressed in the collective bargaining agreement can be determined in
several ways.' Two methods will be discussed here. First, issues not
covered by a collective bargaining agreement could be presumed to
"belong" to management, unless the duty to collectively bargain has
been breached. 5 Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard,46 citing
the need for entrepreneurial control, classically states the employer's
need to be able to act freely.47 The advantage of this method is its
predictability; 48 its major disadvantage is its lack of specificity as to
particular industries.
A second means of allocating the entitlement in the face of the
collective bargaining agreement's silence freezes the status quo on the
basis of the parties' past practices. Use of the past practices method
allows the parties to determine what entitlements are most valuable to
them based on their bargaining history. Freezing the entitlements
based on past practices is more beneficial than a presumption favoring
management because each industry and bargaining unit can choose
the formula that is most advantageous to it.49 Although labor and
management may disagree to some extent over the ownership and
concerned primarily with subcontracting that arises during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement. Although subcontracting is an entitlement that usually initially belongs to
management, see infra text accompanying note 56, the method in which initial ownership is
determined may make a difference in some cases because a method using past practices or
industry standards can give the initial ownership to a union.
44. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing methods and reasons
for deciding entitlements, and rules and regulations for protecting entitlements).
45. The Board recently emphasized this mode of analysis in the Milwaukee Spring II
decision. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd sub
nor. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see infra notes 78-94 and accompanying
text.
46. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
47. Id. at 223 (Stewart. J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court cited Justice
Stewart's concurrence in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677
(1981), as did the NLRB in Otis Elevator II, 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 891, 893 (1984) (plurality
opinion).
48. A similar method is to freeze the status quo in all collective bargaining agreements by
reference to a set of objective criteria. This method also has the advantage of predictability; it
fails, however, to consider the wide disparities in the modes of operation of various industries.
In some industries, subcontracting is a normal method of doing business and is not of great
interest to the union. In others, such as the garment and clothing industry, subcontracting
could easily undermine the union. Ultimately, therefore, the lack of industrial uniformity
makes the use of general objective criteria a poor choice.
49. See Comment, Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern Air Lines. Can it Fly?, 44
U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1989).
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importance of entitlements, such disagreement is preferable to having
a set of fixed rules governing the parties' actions. °
Once the initial ownership of a property right is determined, its
alienability must be determined. Few rights in labor law are inaliena-
ble;"' subcontracting is an alienable property right that belongs to the
employer until contracted away. 52 The parties are free to bargain
over the inclusion of a clause in a collective bargaining agreement that
addresses subcontracting. The clause may either allow an employer
to subcontract freely or prohibit an employer from subcontracting.
The contractual clause may also strike a balance between the two.53
Although some argue that the party that most values an entitlement
will ultimately come to possess it,54 few bargaining agreements have
50. See generally Cox & Dunlop, supra note 1 (describing the differences between the
Board's enforcement of a duty to bargain and the enforcement of fixed requirements on the
parties).
Yet another method to determine the initial placement of the entitlement is to confine the
inquiry to the four corners of the collective agreement. A zipper clause is a clause in the
collective bargaining agreement stating that all subjects are a part of the agreement. By
agreeing to zipper clauses, the parties theoretically waive their rights to statutory enforcement
provided by the Board and the courts. If zipper clauses were so interpreted, the Board and the
courts would order the disputes to arbitrators. Although the Board does not yet use this
approach, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit suggested
such an approach in its opinion affirming the Board's Milwaukee Spring II decision. UAW v.
NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 181-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'g Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring
Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984). The court, in an opinion by Judge Harry T. Edwards, discussed
the zipper clause. Id. Judge (now Justice) Scalia and Chief Judge Robinson joined in the
opinion. Judge Edwards subsequently discussed the waiver theory in a law review article:
When parties negotiate their respective rights and obligations and provide for
binding arbitration of any disputes between them, they effectively waive many of
their statutory rights. The courts and the Board should respect this bargain,
require the parties to use agreed-upon grievance procedures, and refrain from
second-guessing arbitration awards under the guise of determining whether there
has been a breach of the continuing duty to bargain.
Edwards, supra note 40, at 40.
51. Even the right to have union officers free from more serious punishment for
participation in illegal strikes is alienable. See Comment, Arbitration and Selective Discipline of
Union Officials After Metropolitan Edison, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 443 (1989).
52. For a discussion of entitlements in labor law, see Lynch, supra note 23, at 271-312.
53. See supra note 8 (discussing industry statistics concerning these clauses).
54. Some authors theorize that it is of little consequence which party initially obtains the
entitlements. The Coase theorem suggests that the party placing the greater value on the
entitlement will bargain for its receipt regardless of which party gets the initial entitlement.
Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 258 (1987);
see also Wachter & Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining. An Introduction
and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure and Relocation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349 (1988) (analyzing, in "Law and Economics" terms, the employer's decision to
subcontract work, transfer work, or partially close its business). One factor that the Schwab
article does not analyze, however, is the effect that the allocation of an entitlement has on an
arbitrator's underlying values and decisionmaking.
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clauses that substantially restrict subcontracting." The absence of a
subcontracting clause in a collective bargaining agreement, however,
does not mean that an employer cannot subcontract. Because many
arbitrators rule that the employer possesses the right to subcontract
absent a contrary clause in the agreement, 56 a clause that explicitly
permits subcontracting adds little more than additional predictability
to the agreement. The absence of a subcontracting clause from a col-
lective bargaining agreement suggests that an employer's cost to
obtain a subcontracting clause would have been greater than the pre-
dictive value the clause would have provided in the employer's rela-
tionship with the union.57
III. PUBLIC LAW AND SUBCONTRACTING
Subcontracting has been the subject of several important deci-
sions of the Board and the courts. In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. NLRB,5 s the United States Supreme Court considered whether the
subcontracting of work ordinarily performed by employees in a bar-
gaining unit is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under
Subsections 8(a)(5), 8(d), and 9(a) of the NLRA. 59 For more than
twenty years prior to their dispute in Fibreboard, the employer and
the union had bargained collectively. 6° During negotiations over
renewal of the agreement, the employer decided it would be more
profitable to subcontract its maintenance work, and it terminated
negotiations with the union.6' The Fibreboard Court held, however,
that subcontracting of work that the bargaining unit had previously
performed was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 62 The
Court interpreted the phrase "terms and conditions of employment"
55. For a discussion of the use of subcontracting clauses in collective bargaining
agreements, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. See National Sugar Ref. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 991, 1001 (1949) (Feinberg, Arb.)
("It has almost been universally recognized that in the absence of such a [subcontracting]
provision an employer may, under his customary right to conduct his business efficiently, let
work to outside contractors if such letting is done in good faith and without deliberate intent to
injure his employees."); see also Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 670, 672
(1969) (Bladek, Arb.); Stoneware, Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 471, 473 (1967) (Stouffer, Arb.);
International Harvester Co., 12 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 707, 709 (1949) (McCoy, Arb.).
57. See generally Schwab, supra note 54, at 257-61 (arguing that labor and management
distribute entitlements in their collective bargaining agreements according to each party's
valuation of the entitlement).
58. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
59. Id. at 204-05. For a discussion of Subsections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(5), and 8(d) of the NLRA,
see supra note 28.
60. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 205.
61. Id. at 206-07.
62. Id. at 215. For a discussion of the importance of the mandatory-permissive
distinction, see supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
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of Section 8(d) of the NLRA63 to include subcontracting, and con-
cluded that the employer's action was an unfair labor practice.'M Jus-
tice Stewart, in a lasting and influential concurrence in which Justices
Douglas and Harlan joined, wrote:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a
duty to bargain collectively regarding . . . managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions con-
cerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope
of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions
of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessar-
ily to terminate employment. If, as I think clear, the purpose of §
8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to the duty of collective
bargaining, those management decisions which are fundamental to
the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only
indirectly upon employment security should be excluded from that
area.
65
Thus, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion emphasized the impor-
tance of entrepreneurial control of businesses and guided later
Supreme Court and Board opinions concerning subcontracting, work
transfer, and partial business closure.66
Although subcontracting has been considered closely related to
partial closure of a business,67 the Fibreboard holding that subcon-
tracting is a mandatory subject of bargaining does not control in par-
tial closure situations. The United States Supreme Court specifically
addressed the issue of whether employers have a duty to bargain over
the partial closure of a business in First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB. 68 In First National Maintenance, a housekeeping and mainte-
nance company terminated a maintenance contract with a nursing
home and laid off the employees who worked at that site.69 The union
representing the employees filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the Board,7 ° contending that the employer was obligated to bargain
with the union over the partial closure. 7' The Board held that the
employer breached its duty to bargain and ordered the employer to
reinstate the terminated employees. 72 The United States Court of
63. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
64. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 210-15.
65. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
66. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
68. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
69. Id. at 668-69.
70. Id. at 670.
71. Id. at 669-70.
72. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462, 463 (1979), aff'd, 627 F.2d 596 (2d
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the order,73 but the United
States Supreme Court reversed.74 The Supreme Court held that the
partial closure of a business for purely economic reasons was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining even though the closure resulted in
the discharge of employee members of a bargaining unit.75 Relying
on Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard,76 the Court concluded
that the potential harm to the employer's entrepreneurial interests
outweighed any benefit that bargaining over the closure could gain.77
Although the Supreme Court has addressed subcontracting and
partial closure, it has not addressed whether the transfer of work is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The Board, however, has
addressed the subject in the Milwaukee Spring cases.7" In Milwaukee
Spring I, an employer transferred work from one of its unionized
facilities to one that had a non-union workforce in order to save labor
costs."0 The employer bargained with the union before moving the
work, but it was unable to gain concessions from its employees that it
felt were necessary to keep the unionized plant open. The issue before
the Board was whether an employer could move bargaining unit work
during the course of a collective bargaining agreement, after the
employer had engaged in bargaining, solely because labor costs at a
non-unionized facility would be lower."' The parties had stipulated
that union animus was not an issue in the dispute.8 2 The Board held
that the move violated Subsections 8(d), 8(a)(1), and 8(a)(5) of the
NLRAs3 and ordered the employer to restore the status quo ante. 4
73. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S.
666 (1981).
74. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
75. Id. at 686.
76. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677-86. The Court distinguished First
National Maintenance from Fibreboard on the ground that a third party's concession
prevented the employer's action in First National Maintenance, whereas Fibreboard involved
only union concessions. Id. at 687-88.
78. Milwaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. .206 (1982); rev'd, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984)
(Milwaukee Spring H), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
79. 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).
80. Id. at 207. Employees at the unionized plant earned $8 an hour in wages and $2 an
hour in benefits. Id. At the non-unionized plant, management set wages at $4.50 an hour and
fringe benefits at $1.35 an hour. Id.
81. Id. at 206.
82. Id. at 207. Union animus, also referred to as anti-union animus, has been defined as
"an inclination or feeling against unions." Reliance Ins. Cos., 415 F.2d 1, 5 n.4 (8th Cir.
1969). The stipulation that there was no union animus evidences the fact that both parties
agreed that the move was made to reduce labor costs, not to injure the union.
83. Milwaukee Spring , 265 N.L.R.B. at 210.
84. Id.
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While the decision in Milwaukee Spring I was on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court of
appeals granted the Board's motion to remand the case for additional
consideration.8 1 In Milwaukee Spring 11,86 the Board reversed itself
and held that midterm transfers of work during the course of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement were permissible unless the agreement con-
tained a specific clause forbidding work transfers. 87  Although
subcontracting per se was not an issue in the case, the Board's deci-
sion grouped work reassignment and relocation together.88 Although
the Board specifically declined to decide whether work relocation was
a mandatory subject of bargaining,89 it stated that "the same standard
applies in both instances," 90 further implying that the Milwaukee
Spring I decision did indeed cover subcontracting.
The dissent in Milwaukee Spring H analogized the transfer of
work to the subcontracting in Fibreboard.91 Unlike the employer in
Fibreboard, the employer in Milwaukee Spring II relocated the work
solely to avoid the collective bargaining agreement's wage obligations
rather than in response to a change in either the market for the prod-
uct or the direction of the business.92 The dissent viewed the
employer's motive as the determinative factor in deciding whether
Section 8(d) of the NLRA proscribed the employer's midterm reloca-
tion decision. 93 According to the dissent, the decision violated Sub-
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) because the employer's sole purpose in
transferring the work was to avoid paying the contractual wage-a
mandatory subject of bargaining. 94
85. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. v. NLRB, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 206
(7th Cir. 1983). While Milwaukee Spring I was on appeal, there was a major change in Board
membership: President Reagan appointed members who were more closely aligned with his
conservative labor philosophy. Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1982, at A16, col. 2. Later, they were in
the majority in the Milwaukee Spring II decision. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), rev'g 265
N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee Spring I), aff'd sub nor. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
86. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd sub nor. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
87. Id. The Board said that finding protection in the collective bargaining agreement
would "create an implied work-preservation clause in every American labor agreement based
on wage and benefits or recognition provisions, and we expressly decline to do so." Id. at 602.
88. Id. at 604.
89. Id. at 601 n.5. The parties had stipulated that work relocation was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Id.
90. Id. at 604.
91. Milwaukee Spring I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 608 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting); see
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); supra notes 58-66 and
accompanying text.
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In Otis Elevator H,91 the Board discussed the legitimacy of an
employer's decision to transfer work for reasons other than labor
costs. The Board held that an employer may relocate without bar-
gaining if the reason for the move is a change in the "nature or direc-
tion of a business.''96 It concluded that in a transfer for reasons other
than labor costs, the effects on the employees or the bargaining unit
are not important.97 In dicta, the Board said that subcontracting
decisions should be viewed in the same light as work transfer; only
cases based on labor costs fall within the rule of Fibreboard.98 Thus,
when read as a single body of "public law," the decisions of the Board
and the Supreme Court blur the distinctions between transfers, clo-
sures, and subcontracting.
IV. PATTERNS OF ARBITRATORS' DECISIONS IN
SUBCONTRACTING DISPUTES
In Milwaukee Spring H, 9 the Board considered the issue of
whether the transfer of work during the term of a collective bargain-
ing agreement was an unfair labor practice; it held that it was not.'°°
The need for entrepreneurial control of a business-the ability to
respond to changes in the product market-provided the basis for
holding that the right to transfer work belonged to the employer in
the absence of contractual language providing otherwise.101 This
holding could lead one to believe that, after Milwaukee Spring II,
95. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 894.
97. Id. at 891. The Board stated:
[T]he decision turned not upon labor costs, but instead turned upon a change in
the nature and direction of a significant facet of its business. Thus it constituted
a managerial decision of the sort which is at the core of entrepreneurial control
outside the limited scope of Section 8(d) [of the NLRA].
Id. However, the Board did not say that unions could not bargain over the effects of work
transfer. The Board remanded the allegations that management refused to bargain over the
effects of the decision to transfer work to the administrative law judge for further considera-
tion. Id. Because the Otis Elevator II opinion was a plurality opinion and three tests were
enunciated by the Board, there is some confusion about which test applies. For a discussion of
the three tests and the confusion arising from them, see Lynch, supra note 23, at 277 n.225.
98. Otis Elevator II, 269 N.L.R.B. at 893. "Included within Section 8(d), however.... are
all decisions which turn upon a reduction of labor costs. This is true whether the decision may
be characterized as subcontracting, reorganization, consolidation, or relocation, if the decision
in fact turns on ... a change in the basic direction or nature of the enterprise." Id.; see also
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); supra notes 58-66 and
accompanying text.
99. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
100. Id. at 604.
101. Id. at 602.
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arbitrators would tend to hold that subcontracting was an entitlement
belonging to the employer, absent contrary language in the collective
bargaining agreement. If arbitrators, like the Board, value the ability
of employers to react to changes in the product market and to lower
labor costs, then their decisions after Milwaukee Spring II should
reflect those values. Arbitrators' decisions in subcontracting disputes
should swing more in the direction of management. The Board, how-
ever, did not consider whether the employer's actions were made with
union animus because the parties had stipulated that it was not. 10 2
Nonetheless, the method arbitrators use to determine whether sub-
contracting violates a collective bargaining agreement applies princi-
ples of good faith in a way which is similar to determining union
animus.10 3 The next Sections will show that arbitrators continue to
use the good faith test in subcontracting disputes after the Milwaukee
Spring II decision. Because the test for bad faith is similar to the test
for union animus, little has changed in arbitral decisionmaking since
the Milwaukee Spring I decision.
A. The Arbitral Principles of Good Faith
In addressing subcontracting issues, arbitrators frequently refer
to the good faith analysis spelled out in the preeminent authority on
arbitration, Elkouri and Elkouri's How Arbitration Works. 0 They do
so even more frequently than they cite judicial and Board prece-
dent. 05 In even more cases, arbitrators have applied the principles of
102. Id. at 604.
103. See infra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
104. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985). This treatise
is cited frequently in subcontracting cases. See, e.g., Mike-Sell's Potato Chip Co., 90 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 801, 807 (1988) (Cohen, Arb.); Arvin Indus., Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1188, 1190-92,
87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8369, at 5337-39 (1987) (Volz, Arb.); Certainteed Corp., 88
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 995, 998 nn. 1-2 (1987) (Nicholas, Arb.); Kiefaber Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
396, 398 (1986) (Modjeska, Arb.); Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 153,
159 (1986) (Beck, Arb.); Ormet Corp., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 705, 708 (1986) (Baroni, Arb.);
Georgia Kaolin Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 81, 86 n.3, 87 n.7 (1985) (Clarke, Arb.); Ashland
Oil, Inc., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8474, at 4957 (1985) (Flannagan, Arb.); Willamette
Indus., Inc., Red River Mill Div., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8396, at 4635 (1985) (Fox,
Arb.); Federal Signal Corp., Fed. Signal Div., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8386, at 4597
(1985) (McAlpin, Arb.).
105. Only two post-Milwaukee Spring II subcontracting arbitrations specifically mentioned
Fibreboard. See Ormet Corp., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 705, 708 (1986) (Baroni, Arb.); Federal
Signal Corp., Fed. Signal Div., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8386, at 4596 (1985)
(McAlpin, Arb.). For a discussion of Ormet, see infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
Employers have not argued for the application of Milwaukee Spring II in cases concerning
subcontracting, but they have made the argument in two work transfer cases. In both of those
cases, the arbitrator rejected Milwaukee Spring H as a basis for arbitral decisionmaking. See
Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565, 570-72 (1987) (Shanker, Arb.); Fisher-
Stevens, Inc., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 556, 563-64 (1987) (Kramer, Arb.).
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this good faith analysis, but without attribution to Elkouri and
Elkouri. °6 Arbitrators typically consider eleven good faith factors
when ruling on subcontracting disputes. The eleven factors consid-
ered in a good faith analysis are: (1) past practice; (2) justification; (3)
effect on the union or bargaining unit; (4) effect on unit employees; (5)
type of work involved; (6) availability of properly qualified employees;
(7) availability of equipment and facilities; (8) regularity of subcon-
tracting; (9) duration of subcontracted work; (10) unusual circum-
stances; and (11) the history of negotiations on the right to
subcontract. 107 These good faith factors play an important part in
arbitral decisionmaking regardless of whether the collective bargain-
ing agreement addresses subcontracting.
Many collective bargaining agreements contain specific subcon-
tracting clauses. '0 Only two percent of such clauses prohibit subcon-
tracting entirely. 109 Other clauses require the employer to notify the
union of subcontracting, 10 prohibit subcontracting that would result
in layoffs,II or allow subcontracting only if employees with the neces-
sary'skills and equipment are unavailable."12 Although the presence
of clauses prohibiting subcontracting are important in arbitrators'
subcontracting decisions, a good faith analysis can defeat even a spe-
cific clause which prohibits subcontracting." 3 If an employer has
shown good faith and a valid economic reason for subcontracting,
106. The good faith analysis used in F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, utilizes a
flexible set of criteria that incorporates concepts of good and bad faith. The bad faith,
discussed by Elkouri and Elkouri, is similar to the discrimination forbidden by the NLRA. F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, at 538-40; see NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3). If an employer decides to subcontract in an effort to discriminate against the
union, the subcontracting is likely to violate Elkouri and Elkouri's good faith principles and
thus, the collective bargaining agreement.
107. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, at 540-43.
108. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1986); see supra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text.
109. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1986); see supra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text.
110. Forty-five percent of collective bargaining agreements contain notification or advanced
discussion clauses. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1986). For further
discussion of notification and advanced notification clauses, see infra notes 129-32 & 198-202
and accompanying text.
11. Twenty-five percent of surveyed collective bargaining agreements contained layoff
clauses. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1986). For a discussion of the
arbitral treatment of layoff clauses after Milwaukee Spring II, see infra notes 220-40 and
accompanying text.
112. Thirty-one percent of collective bargaining agreements contained clauses addressing
necessary employee skills and equipment. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2
(1986).
113. See, e.g., Laurel Run Mining Co., 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8247 (1985)
(Feldman, Arb.); see also infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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arbitrators have construed very narrowly the express clauses forbid-
ding subcontracting, thereby allowing subcontracting in many
instances.1 1
If there is no specific clause in a collective bargaining agreement
restricting management's subcontracting rights, a union may take the
position that the contractual provisions covering wages, recognition,
and seniority imply an obligation that the employer refrain from sub-
contracting.'15 The generally accepted standard in determining
whether subcontracting violates wage, recognition, and seniority
clauses has been succinctly stated:
[M]anagement has the right to contract out work as long as the
action is performed in good faith, it represents a reasonable busi-
ness decision, it does not result in a subversion of the labor agree-
ment, and it does not have the effect of seriously weakening the
bargaining unit or important parts of it. This general right to con-
tract out may be expanded or restricted by specific contractual
language. 
16
Although arbitrators are loath to imply restrictions on management's
entitlement to subcontract, arbitrators are concerned that manage-
ment's subcontracting decision might subvert the collective bargain-
114. An interesting discussion of arbitrators' interpretations of subcontracting clauses is
provided in Abrams & Nolan, Subcontracting Disputes in Labor Arbitration: Productive
Efficiency Versus Job Security, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 7 (1983). In interpreting a clause
prohibiting subcontracting of work "normally performed" by unit employees, Arbitrator Fred
Whitney held one case of subcontracting to be within the clause because employees could not
have refused to do the work without risking disciplinary action, even though such work was
not a daily responsibility. Mobile Chem. Co., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 363, 372 (1968) (Whitney,
Arb.). As pointed out in Abrams & Nolan, supra, the contractual construction in Mobile
Chemical was overbroad because the clause was not intended to protect any jobs that
employees might do. Rather, the clause was intended to protect the ordinary job assignment of
the workers. Abrams & Nolan, supra, at 12.
115. See Advertiser Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8224 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.),
discussed infra in notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
116. Shenango Valley Water Co., 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 741, 744-45 (1969) (McDermott,
Arb.). This statement is also excerpted in F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, at 540,
and in Abrams & Nolan, supra note 114, at 15. For a list of other arbitration cases that have
expressly applied the Shenango Valley standard, see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note
104, at 540 n.424.
In Shenango Valley, a subcontracting clause in the collective bargaining agreement
required the employer to consider utilizing its own employees before subcontracting.
Shenango Valley, 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 741. The clause also forbade subcontracting of
maintenance work when the employer had qualified employees available to do the work. Id.
The employer in Shenango Valley had subcontracted the majority of its installations of new
water mains over several years. Id. at 742. The union filed a grievance because the installation
of new mains had been subcontracted, but the grievance was denied. Id. at 746. Although
there had been a 20% decline in the size of the bargaining unit caused by attrition, the
arbitrator found that the decline was not in itself evidence of bad faith. Id. at 742, 746.
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ing agreement as a whole." 7 If the factors indicate bad faith on the
part of the employer and if the collective bargaining agreement does
not contain a subcontracting clause, arbitrators often find violations
of the collective bargaining agreement as a whole, or of particular
wage, recognition, and seniority provisions." 18 For example, arbitra-
tors often use the good faith analysis to find a violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement when work that was previously performed
under a collective bargaining agreement is subcontracted immediately
after the renewal of the agreement.1 19
B. The Principles of Good Faith as Applied to Pre-Milwaukee
Spring II Arbitrations
One of the most important factors in determining whether an
employer's decision to subcontract was made in good faith is the past
subcontracting practice of the parties, including the industry's cus-
toms. A substantial number of collective bargaining agreements
incorporate past practices into the subcontracting clause. 2° Even if a
subcontracting clause does not specifically allow subcontracting of
work based on past practices, such practices can demonstrate the par-
ties' contractual intent, and "when not in conflict with the agreement
become an extension of the agreement."' 121 In Alpha Portland Cement
Co. ,122 for example, the collective bargaining agreement allowed sub-
contracting but had no provision specifically allowing subcontracting
based on past practices. 123 When the employer purchased machine
guards which could have been produced by union welders, 24 the
union filed a grievance. 125 In denying the grievance, 126 however, the
arbitrator relied on the company's past practice of subcontracting the
117. See Advertiser Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8224, at 3940-41 (1987) (Baroni,
Arb.).
118. This use of wage, hour, and seniority clauses has not met with success in the work
transfer area. See Comment, The Bases and Limits of Arbitral Decisionmaking in Plant
Relocation and Transfer of Work Disputes, 7 INDUs. REL. L.J. 362, 370-72 (1985).
119. One arbitrator has remarked: "The power to subcontract is the power to destroy.
Obviously the Company cannot recognize the Union as the exclusive agent for its unit
employees, agree upon terms of employment, and then proceed arbitrarily to reduce the scope
of the unit or to undercut the terms of the Agreement." American Sugar Ref. Co., 36 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 409, 414 (1960) (Crawford, Arb.).
120. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1986). Seventeen percent of
subcontracting clauses require past practices to be considered. Id.
121. Alpha Portland Cement Co., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1143, 1148 (1974) (Hilgert, Arb.);
see Safeway Stores, Inc., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1093 (1969) (Koven, Arb.).
122. 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1143 (1974) (Hilgert, Arb.).
123. Id. at 1143-44.
124. Id. at 1145.
125. Id. at 1143.
126. Id. at 1149.
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production of a product that its own employees produced.1 27 In con-
sidering past practices, arbitrators frequently consider whether the
past practice was of a sufficient duration and frequency to bind the
parties. 1
28
Arbitrators also consider an employer's communication with the
union concerning the subcontracting decision. Many collective bar-
gaining agreements contain clauses requiring that management com-
municate with the union before subcontracting. 29 In FMC Corp.,t3°
the collective bargaining agreement contained a clause requiring the
employer to notify the union before subcontracting.13 The arbitrator
held that, although the notification clause did require the employer to
notify the union of its intention to subcontract, the clause did not
imply that the union's consent was required.
1 2
Arbitrators examine whether employers' decisions to subcontract
are supported by genuine business justifications,1 33 and they may find
that a genuine need to reduce costs is a legitimate reason for subcon-
tracting in the absence of union animus.'34  Although an arbitrator
may disallow subcontracting if an employer's cost savings are essen-
tially recouped solely from lowered labor costs,13 5 reduction in other
127. Id. at 1148.
128. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1093, 1095 (1969) (Koven, Arb.).
129. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 65:2 (1986). A 1986 survey found that
45 % of collective bargaining agreements had a clause requiring communication with the union
before subcontracting. Id.
130. FMC Corp., Indus. Chem. Group, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 485 (1980) (LeWinter, Arb.).
131. Id. at 486.
132. Id. at 492. Communication clauses generally appear to incorporate the holding in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)-that employers have a duty
under the NLRA to bargain over subcontracting.
133. See, e.g., Shenango Valley Water Co., 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 741 (1969) (McDermott,
Arb.). For a discussion of Shenango Valley, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Shenango Valley, 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 744-46.
135. One arbitrator has remarked:
. If a company were permitted to contract out bargaining unit work on the
basis of comparative wage rate advantages elsewhere, it would constitute a
privilege to engage in a course of conduct that would nullify its collective
bargaining contract. Followed to its extreme but logical conclusion, all
bargaining unit work could be contracted out to cheaper labor. Simply beating
the union prices set forth in the contract would be comparable to a unilateral
reduction in a negotiated wage which a company has no right to make-and a
company cannot accomplish by indirection what it would not be permitted to do
directly under the terms of a contract.
Mead Corp., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 665, 667 (1980) (Gross, Arb.); see also F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, supra note 104, at 540 n.427.
For a presentation of this argument in "Law and Economics" terms, see Wachter &
Cohen, supra note 54. According to Wachter & Cohen, the sunk-cost-loss rule allows the
employer to subcontract as a response to the product market, but not to reduce labor costs. Id.
at 1378. The sunk-cost-loss rule is placed in the context of subcontracting and partial closure
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business costs is generally an acceptable reason for subcontracting. 36
An employer's good faith belief that a subcontractor can perform a
specialized type of work with higher quality may also be a valid rea-
son for subcontracting.3 7 In Fruehauf Corp.,138 the employer subcon-
tracted a large job for the replacement of window panes even though
the unit employees had performed the work in the past. 39 The
employer believed that the subcontractor would perform the larger
job better."4 The opinion extensively quoted Elkouri and Elkouri,141
particularly stressing that the decision to subcontract was made in
good faith.'42 The arbitrator denied the union's grievance even
though he believed that the union members' work could have been of
the same quality as the subcontractor's. 43 The employer's honest
belief that quality would improve with outside subcontracting was an
overriding factor in the arbitrator's good faith analysis.'t
If an employer's decision to subcontract effectively discriminates
against the union, or if the subcontracting discriminates, displaces, or
causes layoffs among the employees, arbitrators may hold that the
subcontracting violates the collective bargaining agreement.145  In
fact, these issues of discrimination are raised in most arbitrations,
regardless of whether there is a subcontracting clause in the
contract. 
46
questions using the W * H formula. Id. at 1379. The freedom to reduce H (the total hours
worked) is an entitlement belonging to the employer, but the employer is not entitled to unilat-
erally reduce W (the wage rate). Id. at 1378-82. If the employer reduces the hours worked
because a change in the market requires less production, then the employer also suffers the loss
of profits resulting from its sunk investment in capital and labor, a situation similar to the
partial closure situation in First National Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). See
supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text. If hours worked by both unit and subcontracted
employees remains constant, but wages are reduced, then the contract is violated. Wachter &
Cohen, supra note 54, at 1389. Arbitrators tend to find subcontracting cases contravening the
sunk-cost-loss rule to be violative of wage and recognition clauses. If the hours worked are
reduced by the subcontracting, but the wage rate remains the same, arbitrators are presumably
more likely to find a violation of the contract. Id. at 1387-90.
136. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 54, at 1378.
137. See Fruehauf Corp., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 618 (1976) (Strasshofer, Arb.).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 618-19. The collective bargaining agreement contained no clause prohibiting
subcontracting. Id. at 618.
140. Id. at 619.
141. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104.
142. Fruehauf Corp., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 620.
143. Id. at 621. "[T]he decision must be judged by foresight, not hindsight; and th[is]
arbitrat[or] is persuaded that management was of a good faith belief that it was making a
correct decision." Id.
144. Id.
145. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, at 541 & nn.433-36.
146. See infra notes 220-40 and accompanying text.
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C. The Principles of Good Faith as Applied to Post-Milwaukee
Spring II Arbitrations
In recent arbitrations, employers have urged arbitrators to accept
the Milwaukee Spring 11147 holding, claiming that management has
the right to transfer work during the course of a collective bargaining
agreement without receiving a union's consent.148 Nonetheless, arbi-
trators have not cited Milwaukee Spring II as a rationale for allowing
either work transfer or subcontracting. 149 In fact, arbitrators mention
Fibreboard150 more often than Milwaukee Spring II when deciding
subcontracting disputes.151 Furthermore, most arbitrators still decide
cases using principles of good faith, without mentioning Board prece-
dent. 152 Even those arbitrators mentioning Fibreboard still perform
an analysis resembling the good faith test.1
5 3
Arbitrators have not incorporated the reasoning of the Milwau-
kee Spring II decision, possibly because the parties in that case stipu-
lated that union animus was not a factor in the employer's decision to
subcontract. 15 4 In Milwaukee Spring II, the union was not seeking a
ruling from the Board that the employer's decision to transfer work
was made in bad faith; 5 rather, the union argued that the decision to
transfer work violated the collective bargaining agreement based on
the status quo embodied in the wage and recognition clauses. 156 In
response, the Board reasoned that all subjects not in the agreement
were rights belonging to management.
157
147. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd sub noma. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
148. See, e.g., Fisher-Stevens, Inc., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 556, 563 (1987) (Kramer, Arb.).
The arbitrator was not swayed by this argument, and he ruled against the company in a
factually complicated case. Id. at 564-65.
149. See supra notes 105 & 148.
150. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 279 U.S. 203 (1964).
151. See supra note 105. In Federal Signal Corp., Federal Signal Division, 85-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8386 (1985) (McAlpin, Arb.), the arbitrator cited Fibreboard as background
material, but he nevertheless denied the grievance over subcontracting. Id. at 4596-97.
152. See supra note 105.
153. In Federal Signal Corp., Federal Signal Division, 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8386 (1985) (McAlpin, Arb.), the arbitrator cited Fibreboard, but then proceeded with what
was essentially a good faith analysis. Id. at 4596. He performed this good faith analysis
utilizing a seven part test: (1) motivation on the part of the employer; (2) effect on the union
and the bargaining unit; (3) availability of qualified employees; (4) availability of appropriate
equipment; (5) permanent or temporary nature of the subcontract; (6) emergency or unusual
circumstances; and (7) the history of negotiations. Id. (quoting BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, GRIEVANCE GUIDE (6th ed. 1982)).
154. Milwaukee Spring I1, 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1984), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB,
765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 602.
157. Id.
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Since Milwaukee Spring II, arbitrators generally do not prevent
subcontracting unless a collective bargaining agreement contains a
clause forbidding it.15 Arbitrators follow this practice notwithstand-
ing their failure to incorporate the Board's reasoning in Milwaukee
Spring II. In John Deere Horicon Works of Deere and Co.,"' for
example, an arbitrator permitted the sale of equipment and the sub-
contracting of work due to the absence of an express clause prohibit-
ing the sale of the equipment."16 The collective bargaining agreement
included a clause prohibiting subcontracting if the company had the
necessary equipment to perform a job.161 Although the arbitrator
cited no court cases or Board precedent, he did cite to the treatise by
Elkouri and Elkouri.162 The arbitrator noted that a genuine business
reason for subcontracting existed (the employer's lack of proper
equipment) 163 and that no layoffs ensued. 164  Conversely, in Tri-
County Distributing Co.,165 an arbitrator found that the subcontract-
ing of work that employees previously performed violated the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. He did so even though there was no
subcontracting clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the
employer had sold the necessary equipment (thereby making the sub-
contracting decision necessary), and there was a history of subcon-
tracting. 166 The arbitrator noted that an addendum to the collective
bargaining agreement stated that "[o]utside carriers shall not be used
as subterfuge to avoid use of Employer-owned equipment."'167  He
then used this clause to imply that the elimination of two employees
and the substitution by subcontracted labor and equipment violated
the agreement.1 68 The arbitrator's determination was based on an
interpretation of express language in the collective bargaining agree-
ment and on the parties' understanding of that language.' 69 The
employer's desire to lower labor costs did not outweigh the contrac-
158. See supra note 56.
159. 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8407 (1987) (Staudter, Arb.).
160. Id. at 5515.
161. Id. at 5513.
162. Id. at 5516 n.1 (citing F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104).
163. Id. at 5516.
164. Id. at 5517. The arbitrator noted that the large increase in the size of the bargaining
unit was the result of the employer's new methods of production. Id. at 5516.
165. 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8082 (1985) (Perry, Arb.).
166. Id. at 3353.
167. Id. at 3356.
168. Id. The arbitrator also relied heavily on the negotiation history in ruling that the
subcontracting was a violation of the contract. Id. The union had asked for the clause to
minimize the impact of pending congressional legislation that would deregulate the trucking
industry. Id. at 3353.
169. Id. at 3356.
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tual language. 170 In John Deere, however, the arbitrator's analysis of
good faith appeared to weigh more heavily in his decision to allow
subcontracting than any language contained in the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
171
Nonetheless, since Milwaukee Spring II, some arbitrators have
used both collective bargaining agreements as a whole and their spe-
cific provisions, such as general wage, recognition, and seniority pro-
visions, to invalidate subcontracting.1 72  In Advertiser Co. ,173 the
employer subcontracted over fifty percent of the bargaining unit's
work shortly after entering into a new agreement.' 74  Although the
collective bargaining agreement contained no subcontracting clause,
the arbitrator held that the subcontracting of most of the unit's work
was an attempt to destroy the bargaining unit. 175  The arbitrator
therefore ordered reinstatement, back pay, and payment of the
employees' union dues. 76 Although the case occurred after Milwau-
kee Spring II, the arbitrator applied the same good faith approach
that had been used in arbitrations prior to Milwaukee Spring 11.177
Prior to Milwaukee Spring II, past practices of subcontracting
170. Id. at 3354.
171. John Deere Horicon Works of Deere & Co., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8407, at
5516 (1987) (Staudter, Arb.).
172. See, e.g., Advertiser Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8224 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 3940-41.
175. Id. at 3941.
176. Id. The reinstatement and back pay was ordered notwithstanding the automatic
renewal of the collective bargaining agreement provided for in the prior agreement. Id. The
previous collective bargaining agreement contained a renewal clause stating that when one
party did not respond within twenty days to a proposal submitted by the other party, "[flailure
to file a counter-proposal shall be construed as offering the existing contract as the party's
counter-proposal." Id. at 3937. The employer did not respond to the union's proposal, and
the union announced that it had accepted the offer of a contract renewal for a three year
period. Id. at 3936.
177. Id. at 3940. The arbitrator used the following six standards in deciding whether the
subcontracting violated the contract: (1) past practices; (2) justification; (3) effect on unit
employees; (4) duration of the subcontracting; (5) unusual or emergency circumstances; and
(6) the history of negotiations on the right to subcontract. Id. Although the arbitrator did not
directly recognize F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, both the arbitrator and the
Elkouri treatise cited many of the same arbitrations, including Shenango Valley Water Co., 53
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 741 (1969) (McDermott, Arb.). Advertiser, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH),
at 3940; see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, at 540. The arbitrator and the treatise
also cited arbitrations that approved the statements in Shenango Valley (excerpted supra in
text accompanying note 116) which expressed management's general right to subcontract work
in good faith. See, e.g., Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 752, 757 (1968) (Gould,
Arb.); Sealtest Foods, 48 Lab. Arb.. (BNA) 797, 801 (1966) (Vatlin, Arb.); Pennsalt Chems.
Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1166, 1169 (1966) (Kesselman, Arb.); Lynch Corp., 44 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 762, 766 (1964) (Dworkin, Arb.); see also Advertiser, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH), at
3940; F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, at 540 n.424.
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could establish an employer's right to subcontract in the arbitration
setting. 178 Nonetheless, arbitrators have continued to apply the same
good faith analysis and factors. In Public Service Co. 179 for example,
the employer had repeatedly subcontracted the removal of waste ash
from a generating plant over a period of ten years.' After the ten
year subcontracting period ended, a unit employee performed the
waste removal for thirty-five days.181 Subsequently, when the ash pile
became too large for the company's own equipment, the employer
again subcontracted the work. 182 The union filed a grievance pro-
testing the subcontracting of ash removal. 183 The arbitrator denied
the grievance on the grounds that the employer's past practice of sub-
contracting work was well established.184
A past practice of subcontracting can overcome a clause in a col-
lective bargaining agreement prohibiting subcontracting even if there
are employees on layoff. For example, in Laurel Run Mining Co.,1"5
the arbitrator interpreted a provision that prohibited subcontracting
when the employer had available employees on layoff."8 6 Although
laid-off employees were available for work, the arbitrator held that the
employer's past subcontracting of the work-without complaint by
the union-was controlling.'17 Arbitrators will also consider special
circumstances when viewing past subcontracting practices and their
effects. In Island Creek Coal Co.,' Is following an explosion and fire in
the coal mine, the union had allowed subcontracting of repair work
without filing a grievance.8 9 The arbitrator ruled that the subcon-
tracting was not sufficient precedent to allow subsequent unlimited
subcontracting. '90
Other instances of past subcontracting practices, moreover, have
178. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
179. 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8179 (1986) (Seidman, Arb.).




184. Id. at 3727.
185. 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8247 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
186. The provision reads as follows:
Repair and maintenance work customarily performed by classified Employees at
the mine or central shop shall not be contracted out except . . . where the
Employer does not have available equipment or regular Employees (including
laid-off Employees at the mine or central shop) with necessary skills available to
perform the work at the mine or central shop.
Id. at 4031.
187. Id. at 4033-34.
188. 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8040 (1986) (Stoltenberg, Arb;).
189. Id. at 3166.
190. Id. at 3167.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
been insufficient to sway arbitrators to permit further subcontracting.
In Ormet Corp.,191 for example, some past subcontracting of a bar-
gaining unit's work had occurred. 192 The arbitrator held that the per-
manent subcontracting of unit work resulting in the permanent layoff
of ten employees violated the collective bargaining agreement. 93 In
so holding, he concluded that the employer's previous use of subcon-
tracting was not decisive 194 because layoffs had occurred only once in
the employer's previous use of subcontracting.' 95 In that one
instance, the union filed a grievance that the. company settled by dis-
continuing the subcontracting. 196 According to the arbitrator, that
one incident did not establish a history that the employer could use as
evidence of a past practice of subcontracting.'
In Bowman Construction Products,19 8 a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement prohibited subcontracting of production work,
maintenance, and repairs unless the company met with the union in
an attempt to keep the work in the plant.' 99 The employer felt that it
had trouble retaining janitors to clean employee restrooms, and it
took bids on prospective subcontracts before sending notice to the
union and scheduling a meeting.2°° The union filed a grievance,
claiming that the employer had, in effect, decided to subcontract
before the union and the employer could hold the meeting.2°' The
arbitrator held that the employer substantially met the contract's
requirement for a meeting with the union and that the union's subse-
quent failure to offer a compromise had relieved the employer from
any further requirement of meeting with the union.20 2
A genuine business justification may support an employer's deci-
191. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 705 (1986) (Baroni, Arb.).
192. Id. at 707.
193. Id. at 711.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 707.
197. Id. at 710. Although Ormet was decided after Milwaukee Spring H1, 268 N.L.R.B. 601
(1984), aff'dsub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the arbitrator cited only
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), finding that the employer
breached its duty to bargain under the NLRA. Ormet, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 710.
198. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33 (1985) (Bolte, Arb.).
199. The clause prohibited subcontracting unless "[tihe Company [met] with the Union
before subcontracting or farming out and afford[ed] the Union the opportunity to see what
[could] be done to keep the work in the plant." Id. at 34.
200. Id. at 33-34.
201. Id. at 34-35.
202. The arbitrator stated: "What the employer usually seeks when it has a 'meet and
discuss' situation is a compromise solution, which was not offered by the Union in this case."
Id. at 36. The arbitrator, however, -did not address the likely union goals sought by a
contractual "meet and discuss" clause.
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sion to subcontract. In Granite City Steel, Division of National Steel
Group,2 °3 for example, the arbitrator upheld an employer's decision to
lease cars under mechanical warranties instead of continuing to
purchase vehicles and have company mechanics repair them.2° In
Granite City Steel, although the employer's action reduced the
amount of overtime worked, the approximate size of the bargaining
unit remained constant.2 °5
An emergency, such as the need for the immediate repair of
equipment so that production can continue, may constitute another
valid business reason for subcontracting. In International Salt Co.,206
a clause in the collective bargaining agreement prohibiting subcon-
tracting was subject to certain exceptions, including instances in
which the company's employees were not properly skilled for particu-
lar work.20 7 The employer admitted that skilled employees and the
necessary equipment were available, but claimed that it could not
afford the delay in the repair of a front end loader needed for produc-
tion.20 8 The employees were all fully employed,20 9 and it was possible
that they could not have performed the repairs as quickly as the sub-
contractor. 210 The arbitrator denied the union's grievance, holding
that the employer's need to have the work performed immediately
was a valid reason to subcontract.211
An employer may also subcontract in order to obtain better qual-
ity work.21 2 In Fruehauf Corp. ,213 another pre-Milwaukee Spring
11214 case, an arbitrator allowed subcontracting because the employer
believed that the subcontractor's work would be of higher quality.21 5
In Wyandott, Inc., Jeffersonville Division,216 however, an arbitrator
disallowed the subcontracting of painting work normally performed
203. 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8172 (1985) (McDermott, Arb.).
204. Id. at 3721.
205. Id. at 3720. The Granite City Steel ruling may seem opposed to the wage * hour (W *
H) test described in Wachter & Cohen, supra note 54, because it reduces the wage paid by
subcontracting and keeps the total number of hours worked constant. There was no guarantee
of overtime under the contract, however, and it cannot be implied that the parties intended to
provide guaranteed overtime. See supra note 135.
206. 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8187 (1986) (Williams, Arb.).
207. Id. at 3799.




212. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
213. 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 618 (1976) (Strasshofer, Arb.).
214. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
215. Fruehauf, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 621.
216. 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8209 (1987) (Duda, Arb.).
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by unit painters despite the fact that the unit painters work was of
poor quality.2 17 In Wyandott, the collective bargaining agreement
contained a clause that allowed subcontracting of normal mainte-
nance and production work only if the work was performed off the
plant site.218 The arbitrator concluded that the clause limited the
employer's options in that instance to better training, supervision, or
discipline of his employees; subcontracting was not a proper option.219
Arbitrators have also continued to consider the effects of subcon-
tracting on the union and unit employees in post-Milwaukee Spring II
decisions. In Advertiser Co.,22° the primary factor that the arbitrator
considered in denying subcontracting was the layoff of over fifty per-
cent of the unit, a layoff attributable to subcontracting.221 The arbi-
trator concluded that the layoff was the deciding factor,
notwithstanding the absence of a contractual clause prohibiting sub-
contracting.222 The arbitrator viewed the layoffs of all but three of the
eight unit employees as an attempt to "reduce labor costs at the
expense of undermining the integrity and strength, and [the] eventual
existence of the bargaining unit. 223 In Ormet Corp. ,224 the reduction
of the unit by eighteen percent was a predominant reason for the
granting of the grievance.225 In Tri-County Distributing, Inc.,226 sub-
contracting caused the layoff of fifty percent of the bargaining unit.227
According to the arbitrator, the past practice of subcontracting was
insufficient to allow subcontracting that in effect was a subterfuge
used to defeat the agreement.
22
Layoffs, although an important factor in resolving whether an
employer decided to subcontract in good faith, do not conclusively
establish bad faith on the part of the employer. In Rohr Industries,2
29
although unit electricians already on layoff could have performed
some of the work, the arbitrator held that using a subcontractor to
217. Id. at 3871.
218. Id. at 3873.
219. Id. at 3875.
220. 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8224 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.). For a further discussion
of Advertiser, see supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
221. Advertiser Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8224, at 3940-41.
222. Id. at 3941.
223. Id. at 3940-41.
224. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 706 (1986) (Baroni, Arb.). For a further discussion of Ormet, see
supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
225. Ormet, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 710-11.
226. 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8082 (1985) (Perry, Arb.). For a further discussion
of Tri-County, see supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
227. Tri-County, 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8082, at 3355.
228. Id. at 3356.
229. 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8115 (1984) (Gentile, Arb.).
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install a new telecommunications system did not violate a memoran-
dum of understanding prohibiting maintenance subcontracting. 230
The work was not considered maintenance, and the layoffs were not
the result of subcontracting. 231  In Laurel Run Mining Co.,232 the
work subcontracted was not work that the unit members customarily
performed.2 3 3 The presence of unit members on layoff was not deter-
minative of whether the subcontracting violated the contract.234
In many subcontracting decisions in which arbitrators denied
grievances and permitted subcontracting, however, the fact that no
layoffs resulted from the subcontracting was a consideration men-
tioned in arbitrators' opinions. In Granite City Steel,235 the leasing of
cars with warranties for mechanical work caused no layoffs. 236 In Illi-
nois Cereal Mills, Inc. ,237 the arbitrator held that subcontracting of
snow removal did not violate the collective bargaining agreement.238
Power plant operators, unit employees who used front end loaders in
their power plant work, also occasionally used front end loaders to
plow snow. 239 Among the factors listed by the arbitrator in denying
the grievance was the lack of effect on the bargaining unit
employees. 2 °
230. Id. at 3473.
231. Id. at 3472-73.
232. 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8247 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.). For a discussion of
other aspects of Laurel Run, see supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
233. Laurel Run, 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8247, at 4032-33.
234. Id.
235. Granite City Steel, Div. of Nat'l Steel Group, 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8172
(1985) (McDermott, Arb.). For a discussion of other aspects of the case, see supra notes 203-
05 and accompanying text.
236. Granite City Steel, 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8172, at 3716.
237. 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8575 (1985) (Cox, Arb.).
238. Id. at 5354.
239. Id.
240. Id. Only a small amount of overtime was lost. See also Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n, 87-I Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8277 (1986) (Maxwell, Arb.) (citing the lack of layoffs
as a part of the decision allowing subcontracting); Thompson Steel Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) I 8131 (1986) (Bernhardt, Arb.) (citing full employment and increase in
bargaining unit size as part of the decision allowing subcontracting). But see United States
Steel Corp., Eastern Steel Div., Nos. USS-23,43 1, et al., slip op. (Board of Arbitration Nov. 18,
1988). In United States Steel Corp., the Board of Arbitration awarded a large back pay
settlement to the union. Id. at T 49. No union members were on layoff at the time of the
subcontracting, but back pay was awarded for foregone overtime. Id. at T 1. Although the
collective bargaining agreement contained a subcontracting clause, id. at I 2, the Board of
Arbitration held that the employer's difficulties in hiring new employees did not allow them to
circumvent the clause. Id. at I 28. The back pay order was reported to be worth $11 million.
Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
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D. Comparing Pre- and Post-Milwaukee Spring II Arbitrations
Post-Milwaukee Spring H arbitrations indicate that the manner
in which arbitrators make decisions has not changed since before Mil-
waukee Spring H. The good faith test remains the dominant inquiry
in which arbitrators engage. In determining whether an employer
used good faith in the decision to subcontract, arbitrators continue to
focus on such factors as past subcontracting practices, the effects of
the subcontracting on the union and the employees, and the
employer's communications with the union. Arbi rators still mention
Elkouri and Elkouri24I as a guide for determining whether subcon-
tracting violates a collective bargaining agreement more often than
they refer to judicial or Board precedent.242
V. CONCLUSION
In assessing subcontracting, the Board and the courts use meth-
ods different from those used by arbitrators. The Board and the
courts determine whether the NLRA has been violated. 243 The Board
and the courts are bound by precedent. They begin their analyses of
subcontracting disputes by looking to whether the employer has
breached its statutory duty to bargain. 2" If the employer has
breached that duty, that breach constitutes an unfair labor practice.245
Conversely, arbitrators addressing subcontracting disputes look
to the four corners of the agreement and to the parties' intent.246
Arbitrators may be bound by arbitral precedent between the parties to
the agreement, but they are not bound by arbitrati.M awards made
during the course of other collective bargaining ag-eements.247 Arbi-
trators, however, continue to determine whether the parties acted in
good faith. Good faith is a flexible doctrine, and it allows the arbitra-
tor to tailor the inquiry to unique circumstances of thie individual bar-
gaining relationship in the particular workplace. 2 "
The National Labor Relations Board is a body created by stat-
241. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104.
242. See supra note 105.
243. NLRA §§ 8-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-60.
244. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
245. Id.
246. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
247. In arbitrations, the labor arbitrator is interpreting the contract, not the public law. See
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
248. "The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop ...." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 104, at
538-44; supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
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ute. 49 Its rulings are subject to appeal to the United States Courts of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.25 0 Its decisions are
public, and a decision in one case can determine the course of other
collective bargaining agreements throughout the nation. Arbitrators,
however, are creatures of contract.25 ' Most collective bargaining
agreements contain arbitration clauses,252 and the Board and the
courts look favorably upon arbitration 3.25  Although there is no
requirement that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
assent to have an arbitration clause in their agreement, courts may
impose arbitration on the parties. 4
In Milwaukee Spring H,1155 the parties stipulated that good faith
was not at issue in their dispute.2 56 Thus, in allowing the transfer of
work to take place, the Board may not have meant to affect arbitra-
tors' use of the good faith analysis that dominates today's arbitrations.
Since Milwaukee Spring H and First National Maintenance v.
NLRB,257 the course of arbitrators' decisions has not differed signifi-
cantly from prior decisions and rationales. There are three possible
explanations for the consistency of arbitrators' rationales throughout
the periods preceding and following Milwaukee Spring H. The first is
that Milwaukee Spring H and its progeny cover work transfers but
not subcontracting cases. If this is true, then subcontracting is still a
mandatory subject of bargaining, regardless of whether an employer's
decision to subcontract hinges on labor costs.25 '
The second explanation is that the Board and the courts intended
for Milwaukee Spring H and First National Maintenance to cover
transfer of work, partial closure, and subcontracting during the term
of a contract. If so, arbitrators are either unaware of the doctrines, or
they are avoiding these precedents-which do not bind arbitrators.
The final possibility is that the Board and the courts never meant to
affect arbitrators' decisions concerning subcontracting: Arbitration is
249. NLRA §§ 3-5, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-155.
250. NLRA § 10(e), (f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).
251. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
252. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:5 (1989). Ninety-nine percent of
sampled manufacturing collective bargaining agreements and 96% percent of sampled non-
manufacturing collective bargaining agreements had arbitration clauses. Id.
253. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984); United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984). See generally Lynch, supra note 23.
254. See Lynch, supra note 23, at 250 & n.50. In the absence of an arbitration clause, the
Board and the courts will imply one. Id.
255. 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
256. Id.
257. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
258. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
1989]
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a creation of contract and, therefore, arbitrators' decisions are
intended only to enforce the will of the parties. Notwithstanding that
the United States Supreme Court and the Board may have intended
that Milwaukee Spring II and First National Maintenance not be bind-
ing on arbitral decisions, it is likely that the rationale used by the
Board and the courts will eventually affect the minds of arbitrators.
Does this mean that the Milwaukee Spring II decision is mean-
ingless where an arbitrator is concerned? This Comment concludes
that Milwaukee Spring II has not affected arbitral decisionmaking in
subcontracting. Only a relatively short time has passed, however,
since the Board decided Milwaukee Spring II. Moreover, the princi-
ples of good faith are well entrenched in the minds of arbitrators. If
the duty to bargain in good faith was somehow no longer necessary,
arbitrators might be less likely to find a breach of an implied duty to
communicate with the union.259 Arbitrators view breaches of other
implied duties, such as deviations from past practices, as less impor-
tant if the subject of the breach is only a permissive subject of bargain-
ing." An arbitrator is unlikely to rule that the parties intended to
include something in the collective bargaining agreement that was
unnecessary and unrequired. On the other hand, an arbitrator is
more likely to find that the parties' agreement implies an omitted item
when the subject is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
KENNETH M. KIRSNER
259. It has been theorized that arbitrators would be less likely to find a breach of an implied
duty to communicate with a union if transfer of work were a permissive, rather than a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Comment, supra note 118, at 398.
260. Id.
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